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The  distinction  between  implicit  versus  explicit  processes  (or  “intuitive”  versus  “reﬂective”  thinking)  is
arguably  one  of  the  most  important  distinctions  in  cognitive  science.  Given  that there  has  been  a great
deal  of  research  on  explicit  processes  (“reﬂective”  thinking),  it is  important  in studying  the  human  mind  to
consider  implicit  processes,  treating  them  as  an  integral  part of  human  thinking.  A cognitive  architecture
(a  comprehensive  computational  theory)  may  be  used  to address,  in a mechanistic  and  process-based
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. Introduction
The distinction between “intuitive” and “reﬂective” thinking has
een, arguably, one of the most important distinctions in cognitive
cience. There are currently many dual-process theories (two-
ystem views) out there. However, although the distinction itself
s important, the terms involved have been somewhat ambiguous.
ot much ﬁne-grained analysis has been done, especially not in a
recise, mechanistic, process-based way (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer,
011; Sun, 1994, 2002). In this article, toward developing a more
ne-grained and more comprehensive framework, I will adopt the
ore generic but less loaded terms of implicit and explicit pro-
esses (Reber, 1989; Sun, 2002) and present a more nuanced view
f these processes, centered on a computational “cognitive archi-
ecture”.
Given that there has been a great deal of research on explicit
rocesses (“reﬂective thinking”) and the apparent signiﬁcance of
mplicit processes (Sloman, 1996; Sun, 1994), it is important, in
tudying the human mind, to more seriously consider implicit pro-
esses. I have argued that we need to treat implicit processes as an
ntegral part of human thinking, reasoning, and decision-making,
ot as an add-on or an auxiliary (Sun, 1994, 2002). This point applies
∗ Tel.: +1 518 276 3409.
E-mail address: dr.ron.sun@gmail.com
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.001
211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).not only to studying the individual mind, but also to studying collec-
tive processes involving multiple individuals (and the interaction
of their minds) such as in organizational research (Sun & Naveh,
2004).
In this short summary article, a brief review of the back-
ground concerning implicit and explicit processes will be given.
Then a theoretical framework (based on a computational cognitive
architecture) will be presented that addresses, in a mechanis-
tic, process-based sense, issues concerning dual-process theories.
Speciﬁcally, issues concerning different types of implicit processes,
their relations to explicit processes, and their relative speeds may
be addressed within the framework. The notions of instinct, intu-
ition, and creativity are important in this regard and will be brieﬂy
discussed also. This framework will then be applied to social and
organizational modeling where its relevance will also be demon-
strated. Connections will also be made to the notion of rationality
in economic and organizational research.
2. Some background
To better explore the distinction between implicit and explicit
processes, let us examine some background ﬁrst. There are many
dual-process theories (two-system views) currently available (e.g.,
as reviewed by Evans & Frankish, 2009). One such two-system view
was proposed early on in Sun (1994, 1995). In Sun (1994), the two
systems were characterized as follows:
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“It is assumed in this work that cognitive processes are carried out in
two distinct ‘levels’ with qualitatively different mechanisms. Each
level encodes a fairly complete set of knowledge for its processing,
and the coverage of the two sets of knowledge encoded by the two
levels overlaps substantially.” (Sun, 1994, p. 44)
hat is, the two “levels” (i.e., the two modules or components)
ncode somewhat similar or overlapping content. But they encode
heir contents in different ways: symbolic and subsymbolic repre-
entation is used, respectively. Symbolic representation is used by
xplicit processes at one “level”, and subsymbolic representation
s used by implicit processes at the other. Different mechanisms
re involved at these two “levels” due to the representational dif-
erences. It was hypothesized that these two different “levels” can
otentially work together synergistically, complementing and sup-
lementing each other (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005; Sun, 1994). This
ay  in part explain evolutionarily why there are these two levels.
However, some more recent two-system views are somewhat
ifferent, and their claims seem more contentious. For instance, a
ore recent two-system view was proposed by Kahneman (2003,
011). The gist of his ideas was as follows: There are two styles
f processing: intuition and reasoning. Intuition (or System 1) is
ased on associative reasoning, fast and automatic, involving strong
motional bonds, based on formed habits, and difﬁcult to change or
anipulate. Reasoning (or System 2) is slower, more volatile, and
ubject to conscious judgments and attitudes.
Evans (2003) espoused a similar view. According to him, Sys-
em 1 is “rapid, parallel and automatic in nature: only their ﬁnal
roduct is posted in consciousness”; he also notes its “domain-
peciﬁc nature of the learning”. System 2 is “slow and sequential in
ature and makes use of the central working memory system”, and
permits abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved by
ystem 1”. Moreover, in terms of the relation between the two sys-
ems, he argued for a default-interventionist view: System 1 is the
efault system, while System 2 may  intervene when feasible and
alled for (see Evans, 2003, for more details).
However, some of these claims seem, in a way, simplistic to me.
or one thing, intuition (System 1, and implicit processes in gen-
ral) can be very slow, not necessarily faster than explicit processes
System 2) (see Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Helie &
un, 2010). For another, intuition (and implicit processes in general)
ay  sometimes be subject to conscious control and manipulation;
hat is, it may  not be entirely “automatic” (Berry, 1991; Curran &
eele, 1993; Stadler, 1995). Furthermore, decisions made implic-
tly can be subject to conscious “judgment” (Gathercole, 2003;
ibet, 1985). In terms of the relationship between the two  sys-
ems, implicit and explicit processes may  be parallel and mutually
nteractive in complex ways instead of being limited to being
efault-interventionist (Sloman, 1996; Sun, 1994, 2002) and so
n.
It thus seems necessary that we come up with more nuanced
nd more detailed characterizations of the two systems (the two
ypes of processes) in order to avoid painting the picture in too
road strokes. To come up with a more nuanced, more detailed, and
ore justiﬁable characterization, it is important that we ask some
ey questions. For either type of process, in any given situation, the
ollowing questions, for instance, may  be asked:
How deep is its processing (in terms of precision, certainty, and
so on)?
How much information is involved (how broad is its processing)?
How incomplete, inconsistent, or uncertain is the information
available?
How many processing “cycles” are needed considering the factors
above?ory and Cognition 4 (2015) 191–196
And there are many other similar or related questions. See also
Evans and Stanovich (2013) and Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).
Asking such questions may  lead to better characterizations of the
two systems and useful interpretations of related notions. But in
order to do so, one has to rely on some basic theoretical frameworks
to begin with.
3. A theoretical framework
In order to sort out these issues and answer these questions
in a manageable way, below, I will describe a theoretical frame-
work that can potentially provide some clarity to these issues and
questions. The framework is based on the CLARION cognitive archi-
tecture (Sun, 2002, 2003, 2014), viewed at a theoretical level, used
as a conceptual tool for generating interpretations and explanations
(Sun, 2009).
The framework consists of a number of basic principles. The
ﬁrst principle is the distinction and division between procedural
(i.e., action-oriented) and declarative (i.e., non-action-oriented)
processes, which is rather uncontroversial (see, e.g., Anderson &
Lebiere, 1998; Tulving, 1985). The next two principles concern
implicit and explicit processes, but not just one simple division as
in many other dual-process theories. Thus the next two principles
are unique to this theoretical framework, and may  require some
justiﬁcations, which have been argued in, for example, Sun (2012)
and Sun (2014). The second principle is the distinction and division
between implicit and explicit procedural processes (e.g., Sun et al.,
2005). The third principle is the distinction and division between
implicit and explicit declarative processes (e.g., Helie & Sun, 2010).
Therefore, in this framework, there is a four-way division: implicit
and explicit procedural processes and implicit and explicit declar-
ative processes. These different processes may  run in parallel and
interact with each other in complex ways (e.g., as described in Sun,
2014).
The divisions above between implicit and explicit processes
may  be related to some existing computational paradigms, for
example, symbolic–localist versus connectionist distributed rep-
resentation (Sun, 1994, 1995). As has been extensively argued
before (e.g., Sun, 1994, 2002), the consciously (relatively) inacces-
sible nature of implicit knowledge may  be captured by distributed
connectionist representation, because distributed representational
units are subsymbolic and generally not individually meaningful.
This characteristic of distributed representation, which renders
the representational form less accessible computationally, accords
well with the relative inaccessibility of implicit knowledge in a
phenomenological sense. In contrast, explicit knowledge may  be
captured by symbolic–localist representation, in which each unit
is more easily interpretable and has a clearer conceptual mean-
ing.
4. A sketch of a cognitive architecture
Now with the basic principles outlined, I will sketch an overall
picture of the CLARION computational cognitive architecture itself,
which is centered on these principles. Only a quick sketch is possi-
ble here (without getting into too much technical details though);
for details, the reader is referred to the references cited below.
CLARION is a generic cognitive architecture – that is, a com-
prehensive, generic model of psychological processes of a wide
variety, speciﬁed computationally. It has been described in detail
and justiﬁed on the basis of psychological data (Sun, 2002, 2003,
2014).
CLARION consists of a number of subsystems. Its subsystems
include the Action-Centered Subsystem (the ACS), the Non-Action-
Centered Subsystem (the NACS), the Motivational Subsystem (the




























































processing given information (mostly) explicitly through reason-
ing using explicit declarative knowledge (at the top level of theR. Sun / Journal of Applied Research in
S), and the Meta-Cognitive Subsystem (the MCS). Each of these
ubsystems consists of two “levels” of representations, mecha-
isms, and processes as theoretically posited earlier (see also
un, 2002). Generally speaking, in each subsystem, among the
wo “levels”, the “top level” encodes explicit knowledge (using
ymbolic–localist representation) and the “bottom level” encodes
mplicit knowledge (using distributed representation; Rumelhart,
cClelland, the PDP Research Group, 1986).
Among these subsystems, the Action-Centered Subsystem is
esponsible for procedural processes, that is, to control actions,
tilizing procedural knowledge (Sun et al., 2005). Among pro-
edural processes, implicit procedural processes are captured by
LP  networks (i.e., Backpropagation networks; at the bottom level
f the ACS). Explicit procedural processes, on the other hand,
re captured by explicit “action rules” (at the top level of the
CS).
The Non-Action-Centered Subsystem is responsible for declar-
tive processes, that is, to maintain and utilize declarative
non-action-centered) knowledge for information and inferences
Helie & Sun, 2010). Among these processes, implicit declarative
rocesses are captured by associative memory networks (Hop-
eld type networks or MLP  networks, at the bottom level). Explicit
eclarative processes are captured by explicit “associative rules”
at the top level).
The Motivational Subsystem is responsible for motivational
ynamics, that is, for providing underlying motivations for per-
eption, action, and cognition (in terms of providing impetus
nd feedback). Implicit motivational processes are captured by
LP  networks for drive (implicit basic motive) activations (at
he bottom level; Sun, 2003, 2014). Explicit motivational pro-
esses are centered on explicit goal representation (at the top
evel).
The Meta-Cognitive Subsystem is responsible for metacognitive
unctions, that is, for monitoring, directing, and modifying the oper-
tions of the other subsystems. Implicit metacognitive processes
re captured by MLP  networks (at the bottom level), while explicit
etacognitive processes are captured by explicit rules (at the top
evel; Sun, 2003, 2014).
The two levels within each subsystem interact. The interaction
etween the two levels includes bottom-up and top-down activa-
ion ﬂows. Bottom-up activation is the “explicitation” of implicit
nformation, through activations of nodes at the top level by cor-
esponding nodes at the bottom level. Top-down activation is the
implicitation” of explicit information, through activations of nodes
t the bottom level by corresponding nodes at the top level. For
xample, there may  be an inhibitory role for explicit processes to
uppress implicit information (Gathercole, 2003).
The interaction between the two levels also includes bottom-up
nd top-down learning. Bottom-up learning means implicit learn-
ng ﬁrst and explicit learning on that basis (Sun, Merrill, & Peterson,
001). This may  be viewed as online knowledge extraction from
eural networks: Implicit knowledge may  be learned implicitly
through reinforcement learning within the neural networks at
he bottom level), and then may  be explicated to become explicit
nowledge (at the top level). Top-down learning means explicit
earning ﬁrst and implicit learning on that basis. Explicit knowl-
dge may  be explicitly learned, and may  be assimilated into
mplicit processes, through a gradual process (e.g., through rein-
orcement learning at the bottom level on the basis of explicit
ules).
The interaction between the two levels also includes the inte-
ration of the results from the two levels. See Fig. 1 for a sketch
f the CLARION cognitive architecture. The proportion of implicit
ersus explicit processing in the integration may  be determined by
he MCS  taking into consideration a number of factors (Sun, 2003,
014).Fig. 1. The four subsystems of CLARION. ACS stands for the Action-Centered Sub-
system. NACS stands for the Non-Action-Centered Subsystem. MS stands for the
Motivational Subsystems. MCS stands for the Metacognitive Subsystem.
5. Interpreting folk psychological notions
Based on the framework above, we may  re-interpret some com-
mon  folk psychological notions, to give them some clarity and
precision.
For instance, the notion of instinct may  be interpreted and made
more speciﬁc by appealing to the CLARION framework. Instinct,
according to its common, colloquial usage, involves mostly implicit
processes and is mostly concerned with action. Within CLAR-
ION, instinct may  be roughly equated with the following chain of
activations: stimulus → drive → goal → action.  This chain goes from
stimuli received to the MS,  then the MCS, and eventually the ACS.
That is, stimuli activate drives (especially those representing essen-
tial innate motives; Sun, 2014), drive activations lead to goal setting
in a (mostly) implicit, direct (and often innate) way, and based
on the goal set, actions are selected in a (mostly) implicit way to
achieve the goal. Instinct is mostly implicit, but it may  become more
explicit, especially with regard to the part of “goal → action” (Sun
et al., 2001).
For another instance, the notion of intuition can also be
made more concrete by using the CLARION framework. Intuition,
according to CLARION, is roughly the following chain: stimu-
lus → drive → goal → implicit thinking. This chain goes from stimuli
received to the MS,  the MCS, the ACS, and the NACS. As such,
intuition mostly involves implicit declarative processes within
the NACS (at its bottom level, as directed by the ACS), including
those common functionalities within the NACS such as associative
memory retrieval, soft constraint satisfaction, and partial pattern
completion. Intuition is often complementary to explicit reasoning,
and the two  types are used often in conjunction with each other
(Helie & Sun, 2010).
Some other folk psychological notions may  be re-interpreted
and made more precise in a similar manner. For example, the
notion of creativity may  be captured within the CLARION frame-
work. Creativity may  be achieved through complex, multi-phased
implicit–explicit interaction, that is, through the interplay between
intuition and explicit reasoning, according to Helie and Sun’s (2010)
theory of creative problem solving – a theory derived from the
CLARION cognitive architecture. It includes (1) the explicit phase:Non-Action-Centered Subsystem); (2) the implicit phase: develop-
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ottom level of the NACS); (3) ﬁnally as the intuition emerges into
xplicit processes, the explicit phase again: verifying and validating
he result using (mostly) explicit declarative knowledge (at the top
evel of the NACS). See Helie and Sun (2010) for further details. This
heory has been successful in accounting for a variety of empirical
ata related to creativity (e.g., in relation to incubation or insight
eneration).
What about the relations among these different types of pro-
esses, especially in terms of their relative time courses, as alluded
o earlier (Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2011)? An issue was raised
arlier concerning fast versus slow processes with regard to differ-
nt two-systems views. The twin divisions in CLARION, procedural
ersus declarative and implicit versus explicit, deﬁnitely have
mplications for identifying slow versus fast processes. We  may
uestion the conventional wisdom on a number of issues in this
egard, instead of simply assuming the seemingly obvious as in
ome existing views; for instance,
In terms of the division between procedural and declarative pro-
cesses, can fast procedural versus slow declarative processes be
posited?
In terms of the division between implicit and explicit proce-
dural processes, can fast implicit versus slow explicit processes
be posited?
In terms of the division between implicit and explicit declara-
tive processes, can fast implicit versus slow explicit processes be
likewise posited?
What about relative speeds if we consider the four-way division
together?
nd so on. The conjectures as implied by the questions above may
ot be exactly accurate. The whole picture is not so simple; it is a
ot more complex according to the framework discussed thus far.
In this regard, we may  view existing models and simulations of
hese types of processes as a form of theoretical interpretation. In
hat case, we have so far the following tentative conclusions:
Fast procedural versus slow declarative processes (as hypothe-
sized earlier): This hypothesis of the speed difference is generally
likely to be true if we examine many existing models and simu-
lations viewing them as theoretical interpretations (Sun, 2003,
2014; see also Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).
Fast implicit versus slow explicit procedural processes: This
hypothesized speed difference is, again, generally likely to be
true, using theoretical interpretations through modeling and sim-
ulation (Sun et al., 2001, 2005).
Fast implicit versus slow explicit declarative processes: This
hypothesis of the speed difference, however, is generally not true.
Intuition (implicit declarative processes) may  (or may  not) take
a long time, compared with explicit declarative processes. See,
for example, Helie and Sun (2010) and Bowers et al. (1990) for
possible interpretations that contradicted this hypothesis.
Thus, we need to be careful in making sweeping generalizations.
e  may  need to characterize different types of processes in a more
ne-grained fashion than the conventional wisdom would have it.
haracteristics of different processes may  also vary in relation to
ontexts (such as task demands).
Many empirical and simulation studies have been conducted
ithin the CLARION framework that shed light on these issues,
nd substantiate the interpretations made above. See Helie and Sun
2010), Sun and Zhang (2006) and Sun, Zhang, and Mathews (2009),
nd many other prior publications for details (note that work on
ther existing cognitive architectures may  also be relevant, at least
o some of these points highlighted above).ory and Cognition 4 (2015) 191–196
6. Social and organizational implications
The social and organizational implications of the
implicit–explicit distinction within the CLARION framework
have also been explored. Since it is often impossible to run labora-
tory experiments on large-scale social phenomena, they need to be
investigated through alternative means, including through multi-
agent social simulation. In particular, cognitive social simulation –
social simulation that is based on detailed cognitive models – can
be very helpful here, which can accommodate well two-system
views (Sun, 2006).
There are relatively few detailed computational models of
the cognitive processes associated with social and organizational
decision-making, especially the implicit processes involved. How-
ever, studies have shown that not only reﬂective, rational analyses
(explicit processes) but also implicit processes play important
roles in social and organizational decision-making. Can cognitive
architectures, connectionist models, and other computational psy-
chological theories aid social and organizational research, while
taking into account the implicit–explicit dichotomy? The answer
is yes. For example, a number of cognitive social simulations have
been carried out on the basis of the CLARION cognitive architecture,
taking into consideration the implicit–explicit dichotomy. They
include, for instance:
• Certain aspects of organizational decision-making
• Patterns of growth of academic science
• Survival of tribal society
• Moral judgment and ethical norms
Of course, they did not cover the whole range of organizational
decision-making or other social science topics. But we have shown
the relevance of the CLARION framework to social and organiza-
tional research (Naveh & Sun, 2006; Sun & Naveh, 2004, 2007; Sun,
2006). In this regard, we  have not reached the limit yet, so we  do
not yet know where the ultimate limit might be. More explorations
are needed.
As an extremely simple example, let us look into a commonly
used organizational decision task (from Carley, Prietula, & Lin,
1998). In this task, there is an object in the airspace. An organi-
zation must determine its status: whether it is friendly, neutral or
hostile. No one single agent has access to all the information neces-
sary to make a correct decision. Organizational decisions are made
by integrating separate decisions made by different agents.
In terms of organizational structures, there are two  types: teams
(in which individual decisions are treated as votes, and the orga-
nizational decision is chosen by the majority), and hierarchies (in
which recommendations are passed from subordinates to superiors
and the decision of a superior is based solely on the recommenda-
tions of its subordinates). In terms of the structure of information
accessible by each agent, there are two  varieties: distributed access,
in which each agent sees a different subset of three attributes, and
blocked access, in which multiple agents see exactly the same sub-
set of attributes. In Carley et al. (1998), limited human experiments
were done in a 2 × 2 fashion (organization x information access).
The human data showed that humans generally performed better
in team situations. Moreover, distributed information access was
generally better than blocked information access.
It seemed worthwhile to undertake a simulation that involved
a more comprehensive, more psychologically realistic agent model
(i.e., CLARION) that took into account a two-system view. More-
over, with the use of a more psychologically realistic agent model,
the importance of different cognitive capacities and parameters in
affecting organizational performance might be individually inves-
tigated.
R. Sun / Journal of Applied Research in Mem
Table  1
Simulation data (in terms of accuracy rate, i.e., percentage of correct classiﬁcations)
compared with the human data from Carley et al. (1998). B stands for Blocked. D
stands for Distributed.
Agent/Org. Team (B) Team (D) Hierarchy (B) Hierarchy (D)

































tCLARION 53.2 59.3 45.0 49.4
The results of the CLARION simulation (with 4000 cycles of train-
ng for each agent) were as shown in Table 1 (Sun & Naveh, 2004).
he results closely accorded with the patterns of the human data,
ith teams outperforming hierarchies, and distributed access out-
erforming blocked access.
Furthermore, it was shown in Sun and Naveh (2004) that effects
f cognitive parameters, such as proportions of explicit versus
mplicit processing, were often signiﬁcant on organizational per-
ormance. For example, the effect of explicitness of processing
probability of using the top versus the bottom level of CLAR-
ON) was signiﬁcant, and a certain proportion of explicit versus
mplicit processing helped to improve performance. Moreover, its
nteraction with length of training was signiﬁcant as well. As indi-
ated by Fig. 2, explicit processing was very useful at the early
tages of learning, when increased reliance on it tended to boost
erformance. However, by the 20,000th cycle, this effect disap-
eared. This was because explicit knowledge was crisp guidelines
nd they provided a useful anchor at the uncertain early stages
f learning. However, after a long learning process, they were too
oarse-grained to cover all possible contingencies, and were no
ore reliable than highly trained neural networks (embodying
mplicit processing). Many similar points were made. Such results
ay  be outdated by now, but they are still of historical interest
ecause they ﬁrst pointed to the possibilities of combining real-
stic human psychology, social and organizational research, and
omputational modeling.
Beyond this simple example, other work has been carried out
ithin the CLARION framework that investigated many other fac-
ors related to the implicit–explicit dichotomy, as well as other
spects of human cognition-psychology, and their social and orga-
izational implications. See, for example, Naveh and Sun (2006),
un and Naveh (2007), and Sun and Fleischer (2012). Many of the
ig. 2. The effect of probability of using the bottom level (implicit processing) on
erformance over time. The X axis indicates the probability of using implicit pro-
esses. The Y axis indicates the accuracy of performance. The two  curves indicate
he performance after 3000 and 20,000 training cycles, respectively.ory and Cognition 4 (2015) 191–196 195
folk psychological notions that were touched upon earlier can also
have interesting relevance to social and organizational research.
More generally speaking, in relation to economics and orga-
nization theory, Herbert Simon proposed his theory of bounded
rationality that tried to reﬂect real human abilities to reason and to
make decisions. A limited kind of rationality might indeed enable
the social sciences to move beyond existing theories in some way.
But does it go far enough in “respecting” human reality? What are
the true human conditions in this regard?
For instance, Herbert Simon claimed that “Anything that gives
us new knowledge gives us an opportunity to be more rational”
(see Spice, 2000, p. A-11). Maybe, but how “rational” should one
be? What is the proper mixture of reﬂective and intuitive think-
ing (implicit and explicit processes; Sun, 2002)? For example, for
creative problem solving, we need to rely on intuition (as opposed
to reﬂective, rational analysis) to a signiﬁcant degree (Helie & Sun,
2010; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). After all, to be somewhat “irra-
tional” is to be human. The human mind necessarily involves a lot
of implicit, intuitive, instinctual, emotional, seemingly irrational
processes. Herbert Simon also pointed out that “Technology may
create a condition, but the questions are what do we  do about
ourselves. We  better understand ourselves pretty clearly and we
better ﬁnd ways to like ourselves” (Spice, 2000, p. A-11). In my
opinion, this point applies as well to understanding implicit, “irra-
tional” processes, including in social and organizational research.
It is of fundamental importance to appreciate and harness these
“irrational” processes in the individual mind and in social and orga-
nizational thinking.
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